Official websites use. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites. JavaScript appears to be disabled on this computer. The following section describes the various components of the document.
The NRF is part of a national strategy for homeland security. It provides the doctrine and guiding principles for a unified response from all levels of government, and all sectors of communities, to all types of hazards regardless of their origin. The NRF is not an operational plan that dictates a step-by-step process for responding to hazards. Rather, the NRF appears to be an attempt to build flexibility into response efforts by setting up a framework that DHS believes is necessary for responding to hazards.
Within this framework, the NRF gives users a degree of discretion as to how they choose to respond to the incident. The NRF is organized into five parts. The introductory chapter presents an overview of the entire document and explains the evolution of the NRF, and identifies the various actors involved in emergency and disaster response. The chapter also discusses the concepts undergirding emergency preparedness and response by providing a list of what DHS describes as the "five key principles" of response doctrine.
The first chapter of the NRF, entitled "Roles and Responsibilities," provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, the nonprofit and private sectors, and individuals and households. The first chapter also discusses the roles and responsibilities of those who hold various positions within these entities. The second chapter, entitled "Response Actions," describes and outlines key tasks as they pertain to what DHS calls the "three phases of effective response.
Activities related to responding include gaining and maintaining situational awareness, 20 activating and deploying resources and capabilities, coordinating response actions, and demobilizing. These are short-term and long-term recovery. The fourth chapter, entitled "Planning," describes the process of planning as it pertains to national preparedness and summarizes planning structures relative to the NRF.
The chapter describes the criteria for successful planning and offers example scenarios for planning. The final chapter also explains that the NRF and its annexes are posted online through the NRF Resource Center, which allows for ongoing revisions to the document. As mentioned earlier in the report, several studies attributed the problematic response to Hurricane Katrina partly to the implementation of the NRP.
Although the NRP was used for smaller emergencies and disasters prior to Hurricane Katrina, the hurricane marked the first time the NRP was used for a catastrophic incident. The section that follows discusses how some of the changes in the NRF have addressed these criticisms.
The NRP was widely criticized as complicated and overly bureaucratic. Some said it was long and weighed down with technical language. Additionally, users of the NRP reported that the document failed to clarify roles and responsibilities and that the federal chain of command was confusing. The NRF uses less technical language than the NRP, and attempts to make the roles and responsibilities more transparent.
The NRF is also shorter. Still, some have contested the clarity of the NRF. This will be discussed in greater detail later in the report. Despite efforts to make the NRP a nationwide response plan, the NRP was widely seen as not sufficiently national in its focus because it emphasized federal preparedness and response. Some have further argued that the process of creating the plan excluded nonfederal stakeholders, such as states and localities.
Several emergencies and disasters have taken place since implementation of the NRF. In general, responses to the NRF have been mixed. Some have indicated that its implementation has been successful. A review of various reports may hint at some problems, however.
For instance, during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, state officials in Texas said it was the local government's responsibility to set up distribution points for supplies. However, the local government claimed it was unaware of this responsibility.
Other, more serious criticisms of the NRF have surfaced since its implementation. The FCO determines the types of relief most urgently needed, establishes field offices, and coordinates relief efforts.
The PFO, on the other hand, is not a legislatively authorized position. The PFO is designated by the Secretary of DHS, represents the Secretary as the leading federal official, and serves as the primary point of contact for state and local officials.
To some observers such as the Inspector general for DHS , these roles created a great deal of confusion during Hurricane Katrina, because it appeared that two people were in charge of the relief operations. The decision spurred congressional concern prompting several attempts to clarify or abolish the PFO position. Persistent congressional oversight and legislative efforts may have resolved the issue.
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